

THE
INTEREST
OF
GREAT BRITAIN
CONSIDERED,
With Regard to her
COLONIES,
AND THE ACQUISITIONS OF
CANADA and GUADALOUPE.

To which are added,

OBSERVATIONS concerning the INCREASE of MANKIND;
Peopling of Countries, &c.

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MDCCLX.

T H E
I N T E R E S T
 O F
G R E A T B R I T A I N
 With Regard to her C O L O N I E S.

I HAVE perused with no small pleasure the *Letter* addressed to *Two Great Men*, and the *Remarks* on that letter. It is not merely from the beauty, the force and perspicuity of expression, or the general elegance of manner conspicuous in both pamphlets, that my pleasure chiefly arises; it is rather from this, that I have lived to see subjects of the greatest importance to this nation publicly discussed, without party views, or party heat, with decency and politeness, and with no other warmth than what a zeal for the honour and happiness of our king and country may inspire;----- and this by writers whose understanding (however they may differ from each other) appears not unequal to their candour and the uprightnes of their intention.

But, as great abilities have not always the best information, there are, I apprehend, in the *Remarks* some opinions not well founded, and some mistakes of so important a nature, as to render a few observations on them necessary for the better information of the publick.

The auther of the *Letter*, who must be every way best able to support his own sentiments, will, I hope, excuse me, if I seem officiously to interfere; when he considers, that the spirit of patriotism, like other qualities good and bad, is catching; and that his long silence since the *Remarks* appeared has made us despair of seeing the subject farther discussed by his masterly hand. The ingenious and candid remarker, too, who must have been misled himself before he employed his skill and address to mislead

lead others, will certainly, since he declares he *aims at no seduction*, be disposed to excuse even the weakest effort to prevent it.

And surely if the general opinions that possess the minds of the people may possibly be of consequence in publick affairs, it must be fit to set those opinions right. If there is danger, as the remarker supposes, that "extravagant expectations" may embarrass "a virtuous and able ministry," and "render the negotiation for peace a work of infinite difficulty;" there is no less danger that expectations too low, thro' want of proper information, may have a contrary effect, may make even a virtuous and able ministry less anxious, and less attentive to the obtaining points in which the honour and interest of the nation are essentially concerned; and the people less hearty in supporting such a ministry and its measures.

The people of this nation are indeed respectable, not for their numbers only, but for their understanding and their publick spirit: they manifest the first, by their universal approbation of the late prudent and vigorous measures, and the confidence they so justly repose in a wise and good prince, and an honest and able administration; the latter they have demonstrated by the immense supplies granted in parliament unanimously, and paid through the whole kingdom with cheerfulness. And since to this spirit and these supplies our "victories and successes" have in great measure been owing, is it quite right, is it generous to say, with the *remarker*, that the people "had no share in acquiring them?" The mere mob he cannot mean, even where he speaks of the *madness of the people*; for the madness of the mob must be too feeble and impotent, arm'd as the government of this country at present is, to "over-rule," even in the slightest instances, the "virtue and moderation" of a firm and steady ministry.

While the war continues, its final event is quite uncertain. The Victorious of this year may be the Vanquish'd of the next. It may therefore be too early to say, what advantages we ought absolutely to insist on, and make the *sine quibus non* of a peace. If the necessity of our affairs should oblige us to accept of terms less advantageous than our present successes seem to promise us, an intelligent people as ours is, must see that necessity, and will acquiesce.

acquiesce. But as a peace, when it is made, may be made hastily; and as the unhappy continuance of the war affords us time to consider, among several advantages gain'd or to be gain'd, which of them may be most for our interest to retain, if some and not all may possible be retained; I do not blame the public disquisition of these points, as premature or useless. Light often arises from a collision of opinions, as fire from flint and steel; and if we can obtain the benefit of the *light*, without danger from the *heat* sometimes produc'd by controversy, why should we discourage it?

Supposing then, that heaven may still continue to bless his Majesty's arms, and that the event of this just war may put it in our power to retain some of our conquests at the making of a peace; let us consider whether we are to confine ourselves to those possessions only that were "the *objects* for which we began the war." This the *remarker* seems to think right, when the question relates to 'Canada properly so called,' it having never been 'mentioned as one of those objects in any of our memorials or declarations, or in any of our publick acts whatsoever.' But the gentleman himself will probably agree, that if the cession of *Canada* would be a real advantage to us, we may demand it under his second head, as an "indemnification for the charges incurred" in recovering our just rights; otherwise, according to his own principles, the demand of *Gaudaloupe* can have no foundation.

That "our claims before the war were large enough for possession and for security too," tho' it seems a clear point with the ingenious *remarker*, is, I own, not so with me. I am rather of the contrary opinion, and shall presently give my reasons. But first let me observe, that we did not make those claims because they were large enough for security, but because we could rightfully claim no more. Advantages gain'd in the course of this war, may increase the extent of our rights. Our claims before the war contain'd some security; but that is no reason why we should neglect acquiring more when the demand of more is become reasonable. It may be reasonable in the case of *America* to ask for the security recommended by the author of the letter, tho' it would be preposterous to do it in many other cases: his
 propos'd

propos'd demand is founded on the little value of *Canada* to the *French*; the right we have to ask, and the power we may have to insist on an indemnification for our expences; the difficulty the *French* themselves will be under of restraining their restless subjects in *America* from encroaching on our limits and disturbing our trade; and the difficulty on our parts of preventing encroachments that may possibly exist many years without coming to our knowledge. But the remarker "does not see why the "arguments employ'd concerning a security for a peaceable behaviour in *Canada*, would not be equally cogent for calling "for the same security in *Europe*." On a little farther reflection, he must I think be sensible, that the circumstances of the two cases are widely different. Here we are separated by the best and clearest of boundaries, the ocean, and we have people in or near every part of our territory. Any attempt to encroach upon us, by building a fort, even in the obscurest corner of these islands, must therefore be known and prevented immediately. The aggressors also must be known, and the nation they belong to would be accountable for their aggression. In *America* it is quite otherwise. A vast wilderness thinly or scarce at all peopled, conceals with ease the march of troops and workmen. Important passes may be seiz'd within our limits and forts built in a month, at a small expence, that may cost us an age, and a million to remove. Dear experience has taught us this. But what is still worse, the wide extended forests between our settlements and theirs, are inhabited by barbarous tribes of savages that delight in war and take pride in murder, subjects properly neither of the *French* nor *English*, but strongly attach'd to the former by the art and indefatigable industry of priests, simularity of superstitions, and frequent family alliances. These are easily, and have been continually, instigated to fall upon and massacre our planters, even in times of full peace between the two crowns, to the certain diminution of our people and the contraction of our settlements.* And tho' it is known they are supplied by the *French*,

* A very intelligent writer of that country, Dr. Clark, in his *Observations on the late and present Conduct of the French*, &c. printed at Boston 1755, says, "The Indians in the *French* interest are, upon all proper opportunities, instigated by their priests, who have generally the chief management of their

French, and carry their prisoners to them, we can by complaining obtain no redress, as the governors of *Canada* have a ready excuse, that the Indians are an independant people, over whom they have no power, and for whose actions they are therefore not accountable. Surely circumstances so widely different, may reasonably authorise different demands of security in *America*, from such as are usual or necessary in *Europe*.

The *remarker*, however, thinks, that our real dependance for keeping “*France* or any other nation true to her engagements, must not be in demanding securities which no nation “ whilst *independent* can give, but on our own strength and our “ own vigilance.” No nation that has carried on a war with disadvantage, and is unable to continue it, can be said, under such circumstances, to be *independent*; and while either side thinks itself in a condition to demand an indemnification, there is no man in his senses, but will, *ceteris paribus*, prefer an indemnification that is a cheaper and more effectual security than any other he can think of. Nations in this situation demand and cede countries by almost every treaty of peace that is made. The *French* part of the island of *St. Christophers* was added to *Great-Britain* in circumstances altogether similar to those in which a few months may probably place the country of *Canada*.

Farther

“ their public councils, to acts of hostility against the *English*, even in time
 “ of profound peace between the two crowns. Of this there are many unde-
 “ niable instances: The war between the Indians and the colonies of the
 “ *Massachusetts-Bay* and *New-Hampshire*, in 1723, by which those colonies
 “ suffered so much damage, was begun by the instigation of the *French*; their
 “ supplies were from them, and there are now original letters of several Je-
 “ suits to be produced, whereby it evidently appears, that they were continu-
 “ ally animating the Indians, when almost tired with the war, to a farther
 “ prosecution of it. The *French* not only excited the Indians, and support-
 “ ed them, but joined their own forces with them in all the late hostilities
 “ that have been committed within his Majesty’s province of *Nova Scotia*.
 “ And from an intercepted letter this year from the Jesuit at *Penobscot*, and
 “ from other information, it is certain that they have been using their ut-
 “ most endeavours to excite the Indians to new acts of hostility against his
 “ Majesty’s colony of the *Massachusetts-Bay*, and some have been committed.
 “ -----The *French* not only excite the Indians to acts of hostility, but re-
 “ ward them for it, by buying the *English* prisoners of them; for the ran-
 “ som of each of which they afterwards demand of us the price that is usually
 “ given for a slave in these colonies. They do this under the specious pre-
 “ tence of rescuing the poor prisoners from the cruelties and barbarities of the
 “ savages; but in reality to encourage them to continue their depredations,
 “ as they can by this means get more by hunting the *English* than by hunt-
 “ ing wild beasts; and the *French* at the same time are thereby enabled to
 “ keep up a large body of Indians entirely at the expence of the *English*.”

Farther security has always been deemed a motive with a conqueror to be less moderate; and even the vanquish'd insist upon security as a reason for demanding what they acknowledge they could not otherwise properly ask. The security of the frontier of *France* on the side of the *Netherlands*, was always considered in the negotiation that begun at *Gertruydenburgh*, and ended with that war. For the same reason they demanded and had *Cape Breton*. But a war concluded to the advantage of *France* has always added something to the power, either of *France* or the house of *Bourbon*. Even that of 1733; which she commenced with declarations of her having no ambitious views, and which finished by a treaty at which the ministers of *France* repeatedly declared that she desired nothing for herself, in effect gained for her *Lorraine*, an indemnification ten times the value of all her *North American* possessions.

In short, security and quiet of princes and states have ever been deemed sufficient reasons, when supported by power, for disposing of rights; and such disposition has never been looked on as want of moderation. It has always been the foundation of the most general treaties. The security of *Germany* was the argument for yielding considerable possessions there to the *Swedes*: and the security of *Europe* divided the *Spanish* monarchy, by the partition treaty, made between powers who had no other right to dispose of any part of it. There can be no cession that is not supposed at least, to encrease the power of the party to whom it is made. It is enough that he has a right to ask it, and that he does it not merely to serve the purposes of a dangerous ambition. *Canada* in the hands of *Britain*, will endanger the kingdom of *France* as little as any other cession; and from its situation and circumstances cannot be hurtful to any other state. Rather, if peace be an advantage, this cession may be such to all *Europe*. The present war teaches us, that disputes arising in *America*, may be an occasion of embroiling nations who have no concerns there. If the *French* remain in *Canada* and *Louisiana*, fix the boundaries as you will between us and them, we must border on each other for more than 1500 miles. The people that inhabit the frontiers, are generally the refuse of both nations, often of the worst morals and the least discretion,
 remote

terrible from the eye, the prudence, and the restraint of government. Injuries are therefore frequently, in some part or other of so long a frontier, committed on both sides; resentment provoked; the colonies first engaged, and then the mother countries. And two great nations can scarce be at war in *Europe*; but some other prince or state thinks it a convenient opportunity, to revive some ancient claim, seize some advantage, obtain some territory, or enlarge some power at the expence of a neighbour. The flames of war once kindled, often spread far and wide, and the mischief is infinite: Happy it prov'd to both nations, that the *Dutch* were prevail'd on finally to cede the *New Netherlands* (how the province of *New-York*) to us at the peace of 1674; a peace that has ever since continued between us; but must have been frequently disturbed, if they had retained the possession of that country, bordering several hundred miles on our colonies of *Pennsylvania* westward, *Connecticut* and the *Massachusetts* eastward. Nor is it to be wonder'd at that people of different language, religion, and manners, should in those remote parts engage in frequent quarrels; when we find, that even the people of our own colonies have frequently been so exasperated against each other in their disputes about boundaries, as to proceed to open violence and bloodshed.

But the *remarker* thinks we shall be sufficiently secure in *America*, if we 'raise *English* forts at such passes as may at once make us respectable to the *French* and to the *Indian* nations.' The security desirable in *America*, may be considered as of three kinds; 1. A security of possession, that the *French* shall not drive us out of the country. 2. A security of our planters from the inroads of savages; and the murders committed by them. 3. A security that the *British* nation shall not be oblig'd on every new war to repeat the immense expence occasion'd by this, to defend its possessions in *America*. Forts in the most important passes, may, I acknowledge, be of use to obtain the first kind of security: but as those situations are far advanc'd beyond the inhabitants, the expence of maintaining and supplying the garrisons, will be very great even in time of full peace, and immense on every interruption of it; as it is easy for skulking parties of the enemy in such

long roads thro' the woods, to intercept and cut off our convoys, unless guarded continually by great bodies of men. The second kind of security, will not be obtained by such forts, unless they were connected by a wall like that of *China*, from one end of our settlements to the other. If the *Indians* when at war, march'd like the *Europeans*, with great armies, heavy cannon, baggage and carriages, the passes thro' which alone such armies could penetrate our country or receive their supplies, being secur'd, all might be sufficiently secure ; but the case is widely different. They go to war, as they call it, in small parties, from fifty men down to five. Their hunting life has made them acquainted with the whole country, and scarce any part of it is impracticable to such a party. They can travel thro' the woods even by night, and know how to conceal their tracks. They pass easily between your forts undiscover'd; and privately approach the settlements of your frontier inhabitants. They need no convoys of provisions to follow them; for whether they are shifting from place to place in the woods, or lying in wait for an opportunity to strike a blow, every thicket and every stream furnishes so small a number with sufficient subsistence. When they have surpriz'd seperately, and murder'd and scalp'd a dozen families, they are gone with inconceivable expedition thro' unknown ways, and 'tis very rare that pursuers have any chance of coming up with them.* In short, long experience has taught our planters, that they

* ' Although the *Indians* live scattered, as a hunter's life requires, they
 ' may be collected together from almost any distance, as they can find their
 ' subsistence from their gun in their travelling. But let the number of the *In-*
 ' *dians* be what it will, they are not formidable merely on account of
 ' their numbers; there are many other circumstances that give them a great
 ' advantage over the *English*. The *English* inhabitants, though numerous,
 ' are extended over a large tract of land, 500 leagues in length on the sea-
 ' shore; and although some of their trading towns are thick settled, their
 ' settlements in the country towns must be at a distance from each other:
 ' besides, that in a new country where lands are cheap, people are fond of
 ' acquiring large tracts to themselves; and therefore in the out settlements
 ' they must be more remote: and as the people that move out are generally
 ' poor, they sit down either where they can easiest procure land, or soonest
 ' raise a subsistence. Add to this, that the *English* have fixed settled habita-
 ' tions, the easiest and shortest passages to which the *Indians*, by constantly
 ' hunting in the woods, are perfectly well acquainted with; whereas the *En-*
 ' *glish* know little or nothing of the *Indian* country, nor of the passages thro'
 ' the woods that lead to it. The *Indian* way of making war is by sudden at-
 ' tacks upon exposed places; and as soon as they have done mischief, they
 ' retire

they cannot rely upon forts as a security against *Indians*: The inhabitants of *Hackney* might as well rely upon the tower of *London* to secure them against highwaymen and housebreakers. As to the third kind of security, that we shall not in a few years, have all we have now done to do over again in *America*; and be oblig'd to employ the same number of troops, and ships, at the same immense expence to defend our possessions there, while we are in proportion weaken'd here: such forts I think cannot prevent this. During a peace, it is not to be doubted the *French*, who are adroit at fortifying, will likewise erect forts in the most advantageous places of the country we leave them, which will make it more difficult than ever to be reduc'd in case of another war. We know by the experience of this war, how
extremely

retire and either go home by the same or some different rout, as they think safest; or go to some other place at a distance to renew their stroke. If a sufficient party should happily be ready to pursue them, it is a great chance whether in a country consisting of woods and swamps which the *English* are not acquainted with, the enemy do not lie in ambush for them in some convenient place, and from thence destroy them. If this should not be the case, but the *English* should pursue them, as soon as they have gained the rivers, by means of their canoes, to the use of which they are brought up from their infancy. they presently get out of their reach: further, if a body of men were to march into their country to the place where they are settled, they can, upon the least notice, without great disadvantage, quit their present habitations, and betake themselves to new ones.' *Clark's Observations*. p. 13.

It has been already remarked, that the tribes of the *Indians* living upon the lakes and rivers that run upon the back of the *English* settlements in *North America*, are very numerous, and can furnish a great number of fighting men, all perfectly well acquainted with the use of arms as soon as capable of carrying them, as they get the whole of their subsistence from hunting; and that this army, large as it may be, can be maintained by the *French* without any expence. From their numbers, their situation, and the rivers that run into the *English* settlements, it is easy to conceive that they can at any time make an attack upon, and constantly annoy as many of the exposed *English* settlements as they please, and those at any distance from each other. The effects of such incursions have been too severely felt by many of the *British* colonies, not to be very well known. The entire breaking up of places that had been for a considerable time settled at a great expence, both of labour and money; burning the houses, destroying the stock, killing and making prisoners great numbers of the inhabitants, with all the cruel usage they meet with in their captivity, is only a part of the scene. All other places that are exposed are kept in continual terror; the lands lie waste and uncultivated from the danger that attends those that shall presume to work upon them: besides the immense charge the governments must be at in a very ineffectual manner to defend their extended frontiers; and all this from the influence the *French* have had over, but comparatively, a few of the *Indians*. To the same or greater evils still will every one of the colonies be exposed, whenever the same influence shall be extended to the whole body of them.' *Ibid.* p. 29.

extremely difficult it is to march an army thro' the *American* woods, with its necessary cannon and stores, sufficient to reduce a very slight fort. The accounts at the treasury will tell you what amazing sums we have necessarily spent in the expeditions against two very trifling forts, *Duquesne* and *Crown Point*. While the *French* retain their influence over the *Indians*, they can easily keep our long extended frontier in continual alarm, by a very few of those people; and with a small number of regulars and militia, in such a country, we find they can keep an army of ours in full employ for several years. We therefore shall not need to be told by our colonies, that if we leave *Canada*, however circumscrib'd, to the *French*, "*we have done nothing*;" we shall soon be made sensible ourselves of this truth, and to our cost.

I would not be understood to deny that even if we subdue and retain *Canada*, some few forts may be of use to secure the goods of the traders, and protect the commerce, in case of any sudden misunderstanding with any tribe of *Indians*: but these forts will be best under the care of the colonies interested in the *Indian* trade, and garrison'd by their provincial forces, and at their own expence. Their own interest will then induce the *American* governments to take care of such forts in proportion to their importance; and see that the officers keep their corps full and mind their duty. But any troops of ours plac'd there and accountable here, would, in such remote and obscure places and at so great a distance from the eye and inspection of superiors, soon become of little consequence, even tho' the *French* were left in possession of *Canada*. If the four independent companies maintained by the crown in *New York* more than forty years, at a great expence, consisted, for most part of the time, of fagots chiefly; if their officers enjoy'd their places as *sine cures*, and were only, as a writer * of the country styles them, a kind of *military monks*; if this was the state of troops posted in a populous country, where the imposition could not be so well conceal'd; what may we expect will be the case of those that shall be posted two, three or four hundred miles from the inhabitants,

* *Douglas*.

in such obscure and remote places as *Crown Point*, *Oswego*, *Duquesne* or *Niagara*? they would scarce be even faggots; they would dwindle to mere names upon paper, and appear nowhere but upon the muster rolls.

Now all the kinds of security we have mention'd are obtain'd by subduing and retaining *Canada*. Our present possessions in *America*, are secur'd; our planters will no longer be massacred by the *Indians*, who depending absolutely on us for what are now become the necessaries of life to them, guns, powder, hatchets, knives, and cloathing; and having no other *Europeans* near, that can either supply them, or instigate them against us; there is no doubt of their being always dispos'd, if we treat them with common justice, to live in perpetual peace with us. And with regard to *France*, she cannot in case of another war, put us to the immense expence of defending that long extended frontier; we shall then, as it were have our backs against a wall in *America*, the sea-coast will be easily protected by our superior naval power; and here "our own watchfulness and our strength" will be properly, and cannot but be successfully employed. In this situation the force now employed in that part of the world, may be spar'd for any other service here or elsewhere; so that both the offensive and defensive strength of the *British* empire on the whole will be greatly increased.

But to leave the *French* in possession of *Canada* when it is in our power to remove them, and depend, as the remarker proposes, on our own "*strength and watchfulness*" to prevent the mischiefs that may attend it, seems neither safe nor prudent. Happy as we now are, under the best of kings, and in the prospect of a succession promising every felicity a nation was ever bless'd with: happy too in the wisdom and vigour of every part of the administration, particularly that part whose peculiar province is the *British* plantations, a province every true *Englishman* sees with pleasure under the principal direction of a nobleman, as much distinguish'd by his great capacity, as by his unweried and disinterested application to this important department; we cannot, we ought not to promise ourselves the uninterrupted continuance of those blessings. The safety of a considerable part of the state, and the interest of the whole are not to be trusted to the
wisdom

wisdom and vigour of future administrations, when a security is to be had more effectual, more constant, and much less expensive. They who can be moved by the apprehension of dangers so remote as that of a future independence of our colonies (a point I shall hereafter consider) seem scarcely consistent with themselves when they suppose we may rely on the wisdom and vigour of an administration for their safety.

I should indeed think it less material whether *Canada* were ceded to us or not, if I had in view only the *security of possession* in our colonies. I entirely agree with the Remarker, that we are in *North America* “ a far greater continental as well as naval power;” and that only cowardice or ignorance can subject our colonies there to a *French* conquest. But for the same reason I disagree with him widely upon another point. I do not think that our “ blood and treasure has been expended,” as he intimates, “ *in the cause of the colonies,*” and that we are “ making conquests for them :” yet I believe this is too common an error. I do not say they are altogether unconcerned in the event. The inhabitants of them are, in common with the other subjects of *Great Britain*, anxious for the glory of her crown, and extent of her power and commerce, the welfare and future repose of the whole *British* people. They could not therefore but take a large share in the affronts offered to *Britain*, and have been animated with a truly *British* spirit to exert themselves beyond their strength, and against their evident interest. Yet so unfortunate have they been, that their virtue has made against them; for upon no better foundation than this, have they been supposed the authors of a war carried on *for their advantage only*. It is a great mistake to imagine that the *American* country in question between *Great Britain* and *France*, is claimed as the property of any individuals or publick body in *America*, or that the possession of it by *Great Britain*, is likely, in any lucrative view, to redound at all to the advantage of any person there. On the other hand, the bulk of the inhabitants of *North America* are landowners, whose lands are inferior in value to those of *Britain*, only by the want of an equal number of people. It is true the accession of the large territory claimed before the war began, especially if that be secured by the possession of *Canada*, will tend

to the increase of the *British* subjects faster than if they had been confined within the mountains: yet the increase within the mountains only, would evidently make the comparative population equal to that of *Great Britain* much sooner than it can be expected when our people are spread over a country six times as large. I think this is the only point of light in which this question is to be viewed, and is the only one in which any of the colonies are concerned. No colony, no possessor of lands in any colony, therefore wishes for conquests, or can be benefited by them, otherwise than as they may be a means of securing peace on their borders. No considerable advantage has resulted to the colonies by the conquests of this war, or can result from confirming them by the peace, but what they must enjoy in common with the rest of the *British* people; with this evident drawback from their share of these advantages, that they will necessarily lessen, or at least prevent the increase of the value of what makes the principal part of their private property. A people spread thro' the whole tract of country on this side the *Mississippi*, and secured by *Canada* in our hands, would probably for some centuries find employment in agriculture, and thereby free us at home effectually from our fears of *American* manufactures. Unprejudic'd men well know that all the penal and prohibitory laws that ever were thought on, will not be sufficient to prevent manufactures in a country whose inhabitants surpass the number that can subsist by the husbandry of it. That this will be the case in *America* soon, if our people remain confined within the mountains, and almost as soon should it be unsafe for them to live beyond, tho' the country be ceded to us, no man acquainted with political and commercial history can doubt. Manufactures are founded in poverty. It is the multitude of poor without land in a country, and who must work for others at low wages or starve, that enables undertakers to carry on a manufacture, and afford it cheap enough to prevent the importation of the same kind from abroad, and to bear the expence of its own exportation. But no man who can have a peice of land of his own, sufficient by his labour to subsist his family in plenty, is poor enough to be a manufacturer and work for a master. Hence while there is land enough in *America* for our people, there can never be manufactures to any amount or value. It is a striking
 observation

observation of a very *able pen*, that the natural livelihood of the thin inhabitants of a forest country, is hunting; that of a greater number, pasturage; that of a middling population, agriculture; and that of the greatest, manufactures; which last must subsist the bulk of the people in a full country, or they must be subsisted by charity, or perish. The extended population, therefore, that is most advantageous to *Great Britain*, will be best effected, because only effectually secur'd by our possession of *Canada*. So far as the being of our present colonies in *North America* is concerned, I think indeed with the *remarker*, that the *French* there are not “*an enemy to be apprehended*,” but the expression is too vague to be applicable to the present, or indeed to any other case. *Algiers*, *Tunis* and *Tripoli*, unequal as they are to this nation in power and numbers of people, are enemies to be still apprehended; and the *Highlanders* of *Scotland* have been so for many ages by the greatest princes of *Scotland* and *Britain*. The wild *Irish* were able to give a great deal of disturbance even to Queen *Elizabeth*, and cost her more blood and treasure than her war with *Spain*. *Canada* in the hands of *France* has always stinted the growth of our colonies: In the course of this war, and indeed before it, has disturb'd and vex'd even the best and strongest of them, has found means to murder thousands of their people and unfertle a great part of their country. Much more able will it be to starve the growth of an infant settlement. *Canada* has also found means to make this nation to spend two or three millions a year in *America*; and a people, how small soever, that in their present situation, can do this as often as we have a war with them, is, methinks, “*an enemy to be apprehended*.”

Our *North American* colonies are to be considered as the frontier of the *British* empire on that side. The frontier of any dominion being attack'd, it becomes not merely “*the cause*” of the people immediately affected, (the inhabitants of that frontier) but properly “*the cause*” of the whole body. Where the frontier people owe and pay obedience, there they have a right to look for protection. No political proposition is better established than this. It is therefore invidious to represent the “*blood and treasure*” spent in this war, as spent in “*the cause of the colonies*” only, and that they are “*absurd and ungrateful*” if they

they think we have done nothing unless we "make conquests for them," and reduce *Canada* to gratify their "vain ambition on," &c. It will not be a conquest for them, nor gratify any vain ambition of theirs. It will be a conquest for the whole, and all our people will, in the increase of trade and the ease of taxes, find the advantage of it. Should we be obliged at any time to make a war for the protection of our commerce, and to secure the exportation of our manufactures, would it be fair to represent such a war merely as blood and treasure spent in the cause of the weavers of *Yorkshire*, *Norwich*, or the *West*, the cutlers of *Sheffield*, or the button-makers of *Birmingham*? I hope it will appear before I end these sheets, that if ever there was a *national war*, this is truly such a one: a war in which the interest of the *whole* nation is directly and fundamentally concerned.

Those who would be thought deeply skilled in human nature effect to discover self-interested views every where at the bottom of the fairest, the most generous conduct. Suspensions and charges of this kind, meet with ready reception and belief in the minds even of the multitude; and therefore less acuteness and address than the *remarker* is possessed of, would be sufficient to persuade the nation generally, that all the zeal and spirit manifested and exerted by the colonies in this war, was only in "their own cause" to "make conquests for themselves," to engage us to make more for them, to gratify their "own vain ambition." But should they now humbly address the mother country in the terms and sentiments of the *remarker*, return her their grateful acknowledgments for the blood and treasure she had spent in "*their cause*," confess that enough had been done "*for them*;" allow that "*English* forts raised in proper passes, will, with the wisdom and vigour of her administration" be a sufficient future protection; express their desires that their people may be confined within the mountains, lest if they are suffered to spread and extend themselves in the fertile and pleasant country on the other side, they should "*increase infinitely from all causes*," "live wholly on their own labour" and become independent; beg therefore that the *French* may be suffered to remain in possession of *Canada*, as their neighbourhood may be useful to prevent our increase; and the removing them

may " in its consequences be even dangerous." I say, should such an address from the colonies, make its appearance here, though, according to the *remarker*, it would be a most just and reasonable one; would it not, might it not with more justice be answered; We understand you, gentlemen, perfectly well: you have only your own interest in view: you want to have the people confined within your present limits, that in a few years the lands you are possessed of may increase tenfold in value! you want to reduce the price of labour by increasing numbers on the same territory, that you may be able to set up manufactures and vie with your mother country! you would have your people kept in a body, that you may be more able to dispute the commands of the crown, and obtain an independancy. You would have the *French* left in *Canada*, to exercise your military virtue, and make you a warlike people, that you may have more confidence to embark in schemes of disobedience, and greater ability to support them! You have tasted too, the sweets of TWO OR THREE MILLIONS *Sterling per annum* spent among you by our fleets and forces, and you are unwilling to be without a pretence for kindling up another war, and thereby occasioning a repetition of the same delightful doses! But gentlemen, allow us to understand our interest a little likewise: we shall remove the *French* from *Canada* that you may live in peace, and we be no more drained by your quarrels. You shall have land enough to cultivate, that you may have neither necessity nor inclination to go into manufactures, and we will manufacture for you and govern you.

A reader of the remarks may be apt to say; if this writer would have us restore *Canada* on principles of moderation, how can we consistent with those principles, retain *Gaudaloup*, which he represents of so much greater value! I will endeavour to explain this, because by doing it I shall have an opportunity of showing the truth and good sense of the answer to the interested application I have just supposed. The author then is only *apparently* and not *really* inconsistent with himself. If we can obtain the credit of moderation by restoring *Canada*, it is well: but we should, however, restore it at all events; because it would not only be of no use to us, but " the possession of it (in " his opinion) may in its consequence be dangerous." As how?

Why?

Why, plainly, (at length it comes out) if the *French* are not left there to check the growth of our colonies, “ they will extend themselves almost without bounds into the inland parts, and increase infinitely from all causes;--- becoming a numerous, hardy, *independent* people, possessed of a strong country, communicating little or not at all with *England*, living wholly on their own labour, and in process of time knowing little and enquiring little about the mother country.” In short, according to this writer, our present colonies are large enough and numerous enough, and the *French* ought to be left in *North America* to prevent their increase, lest they become not only *useless* but *dangerous* to *Britain*.

I agree with the gentleman, that with *Canada* in our possession, our people in *America* will increase amazingly. I know that their common rate of increase, where they are not molested by the enemy, is doubling their numbers every twenty five years by natural generation only, exclusive of the accession of foreigners.† I think this increase continuing, would probably in a century more, make the number of *British* subjects on that side the water more numerous than they now are on this; but I am far from entertaining on that account, any fears of their becoming either *useless* or *dangerous* to us; and I look on those fears, to be merely imaginary and without any probable foundation. The *remarker* is reserv'd in giving his reasons, as in his opinion this “ is not a fit subject for discussion.” I shall give mine, because I conceive it a subject necessary to be discuss'd; and the rather, as those fears how groundless and chimerical soever, may by possessing the multitude, possibly induce the ablest ministry to conform to them against their own judgment, and thereby prevent the assuring to the

† The reason of this greater increase in *America* than in *Europe*, is, that in old settled countries, all trades, farms, offices, and employments are full, and many people refrain marrying till they see an opening, in which they can settle themselves, with a reasonable prospect of maintaining a family: but in *America*, it being easy to obtain land which with moderate labour will afford subsistence and something to spare, people marry more readily and earlier in life, whence arises a numerous offspring and the swift population of those countries. 'Tis a common error that we cannot fill our provinces or increase the number of them, without draining this nation of its people. The increment alone of our present colonies is sufficient for both those purposes.

the *British* name and nation a stability and permanency that no man acquainted with history durst have hoped for, 'till our *American* possessions opened the pleasing prospect.

The remarker thinks that our people in *America*, "finding
 " no check from *Canada* would extend themselves almost with-
 " out bounds into the inland parts, and increase infinitely from
 " all causes." The very reason he assigns for their so extending,
 and which is indeed the true one, their being "invited to it by
 " the pleasantness, fertility and plenty of the country," may
 satisfy us, that this extension will continue to proceed as long as
 there remains any pleasant fertile country within their reach. And
 if we even suppose them confined by the waters of the *Mississippi*
 westward, and by those of *St. Laurence* and the lakes to the north-
 ward, yet still we shall leave them room enough to increase even
 in the *sparsè* manner of settling now practis'd there, till they a-
 mount to perhaps a hundred millions of souls. This must take
 some centuries to fulfil, and in the mean time, this nation must
 necessarily supply them with the manufactures they consume, be-
 cause the new settlers will be employ'd in agriculture, and the new
 settlements will so continually draw off the spare hands from the
 old, that our present colonies will not, during the period we have
 mention'd, find themselves in a condition to manufacture even for
 their own inhabitants, to any considerable degree, much less for
 those who are settling behind them. Thus our *trade* must, till
 that country becomes as fully peopled as *England*, that is for cen-
 turies to come, be continually increasing, and with it our naval
 power; because the ocean is between us and them, and our *ships*
 and seamen must increase as that trade increases.

The human body and the political differ in this, that the first
 is limited by nature to a certain stature, which, when attain'd
 it cannot, ordinarily, exceed; the other by better government
 and more prudent police, as well as by change of manners and
 other circumstances, often takes fresh starts of growth, after being
 long at a stand; and may add ten fold to the dimensions it had
 for ages been confined to. The mother being of full stature, is
 in a few years equal'd by a growing daughter: but in the case
 of a mother country and her colonies, it is quite different. The
 growth

growth of the children tends to encrease the growth of the mother, and so the difference and superiority is longer preserv'd.

Were the inhabitants of this island limited to their present number by any thing in nature, or by unchangeable circumstances, the equality of population between the two countries might indeed sooner come to pass : but sure experience in those parts of the island where manufactures have been introduc'd, teaches us, that people increase and multiply in proportion as the means and facility of gaining a livelihood increase; and that this island, if they could be employed, is capable of supporting ten times its present number of people. In proportion therefore, as the demand increases for the manufactures of *Britain*, by the increase of people in her colonies, the numbers of her people at home will increase, and with them the strength as well as the wealth of the nation. For satisfaction in this point let the reader compare in his mind the number and force of our present fleets, with our fleet in *Queen Elizabeth's time** before we had colonies. Let him compare the ancient with the present state of our towns and ports on our western coast, *Manchester, Liverpool, Kendal, Lancaster, Glasgow*, and the countries round them, that trade with and manufacture for our colonies, not to mention *Leeds, Halifax, Sheffield* and *Birmingham*, and consider what a difference there is in the numbers of people, buildings, rents, and the value of land and of the produce of land, even if he goes back no farther than is within man's memory. Let him compare those countries with others on this same island, where manufactures have not yet extended themselves, observe the present difference, and reflect how much greater our strength may be, if numbers give strength, when our manufacturers shall occupy every part of the island where they can possibly be subsisted.

But, say the objectors, " there is a certain distance from the sea, in *America*, beyond which the expence of carriage will put a stop to the sale and consumption of your manufactures; and this, with the difficulty of making returns for them, will oblige the inhabitants to manufacture for themselves; of course, if you suffer your people to extend their settlements beyond that distance

* Viz. 40 sail, none of more than 40 guns.

taunce, your people become useles to you :” and this distance is limited by some to 200 miles, by others to the *Apalachian* mountains. Not to insist on a very plain truth, that no part of a dominion, from whence a government may on occasion draw supplies and aids both of men and money, tho’ at too great a distance to be supply’d with manufactures from some other part, is therefore to be deem’d useles to the whole; I shall endeavour to show that these imaginary limits of utility, even in point of commerce are much too narrow.

The inland parts of the continent of *Europe* are much farther from the sea than the limits of settlement propos’d for *America*. *Germany* is full of tradesmen and artificers of all kinds, and the governments there, are not all of them always favourable to the commerce of *Britain*, yet it is a well-known fact, that our manufactures find their way even into the heart of *Germany*. Ask the great manufacturers and merchants of the *Leeds*, *Sheffield*, *Birmingham*, *Manchester* and *Norwich* goods, and they will tell you, that some of them send their riders frequently thro’ *France* or *Spain* and *Italy*, up to *Vienna* and back thro’ the middle and nothern parts of *Germany*, to show samples of their wares and collect orders, which they receive by almost every mail, to a vast amount. Whatever charges arise on the carriage of goods, are added to the value, and all paid by the consumer. If these nations over whom we have no government, over whose consumption we can have no influence, but what arises from the cheapness and goodness of our wares; whose trade, manufactures, or commercial connections are not subject to the controul of our laws, as those of our colonies certainly are in some degree: I say, if these nations purchase and consume such quantities of our goods, notwithstanding the remoteness of their situation from the sea; how much less likely is it that the settlers in *America*, who must for ages be employ’d in agriculture chiefly, should make cheaper for themselves the goods our manufacturers at present supply them with; even if we suppose the carriage five, six or seven hundred miles from the sea as difficult and expensive as the like distance into *Germany*: whereas in the latter, the natural distances are frequently doubled by political obstructions, I mean the intermix’d territories and clashing interests

terests of princes. But when we consider that the inland parts of *America* are penetrated by great navigable rivers; that there are a number of great lakes, communicating with each other, with those rivers and with the sea, very small portages here and there excepted,* that the sea coasts (if one may be allow'd the expression) of those lakes only, amount at least to 2700 miles exclusive of the rivers running into them; many of which are navigable to a great extent for boats and canoes, thro' vast tracts of country; how little likely is it that the expence on the carriage of our goods into those countries, should prevent the use of them. If the poor *Indians* in those remote parts are now able to pay for the linnen, woolen and iron wares they are at present furnish'd with by the *French* and *English* traders, tho' *Indians* have nothing but what they get by hunting, and the goods are loaded with all the impositions fraud and knavery can contrive to inhanche their value; will not industrious *English* farmers, hereafter settled in those countries, be much better able to pay for what shall be brought them in the way of fair commerce?

If it is asked, what can such farmers raise, wherewith to pay for the manufactures they may want from us? I answer, that the inland parts of *America* in question are well known to be fitted for the production of hemp, flax, potash, and above all silk; the southern parts, may produce olive oil, raisons, currans, indigo, and cochineal. Not to mention horses and black cattle, which may easily be driven to the maritime markets, and at the same time assist in conveying other commodities. That the commodities first mentioned, may easily by water or land carriage be brought to the sea ports from interior *America*, will not seem incredible, when we reflect, that hemp formerly came from the *Ukraine* and most southern parts of *Russia* to *Wologda*, and down the *Dwina* to *Archangel*, and thence by a perilous navigation round the *North Cape* to *England* and other parts of *Europe*.

* From *New York* into lake *Ontario*, the land carriage of the several portages altogether, amounts to but about 27 miles. From lake *Ontario* into lake *Erie*, the land carriage at *Niagara* is but about 12 miles. All the lakes above *Niagara* communicate by navigable straits, so that no land carriage is necessary, to go out of one into another. From *Presqu'isse* on lake *Erie*, there are but 15 miles land-carriage, and that a good waggon road, to *Beef River* a branch of the *Ohio*, which brings you into a navigation of many thousand miles inland, if you take together the *Ohio*, the *Mississipi*, and all the great rivers and branches that run into them.

Europe. It now comes from the same country up the *Dnieper* and down the *Duna* with much land carriage. Great part of the *Russia* iron, no high priced commodity, is brought 3000 miles by land and water from the heart of *Siberia*. Furs, [the produce too of *America*] are brought to *Amsterdam* from all parts of *Siberia*, even the most remote, *Kamschatka*. The same country furnishes me with another instance of extended inland commerce. It is found worth while to keep up a mercantile communication between *Peking* in *China* and *Petersburgh*. And none of these instances of inland commerce exceed those of the courses by which, at several periods, the whole trade of the *East* was carried on. Before the prosperity of the *Mameluke* dominion in *Egypt* fixed the staple for the riches of the *East* at *Cairo* and *Alexandria*, whither they were brought from the *Red Sea*, great part of those commodities were carried to the cities of *Cashgar* and *Balk*. This gave birth to those towns, that still subsist upon the remains of their ancient opulence; amidst a people and country equally wild. From thence those goods were carried down the *Amú*, the ancient *Oxus*, to the *Caspian* Sea, and up the *Wolga* to *Astrachan*, from whence they were carried over to, and down the *Don* to the mouth of that river, and thence again the *Venetians* directly, and the *Genoese* and *Venetians* indirectly by way of *Kassa* and *Trebisonde*, dispers'd them thro' the *Mediterranean* and some other parts of *Europe*. Another part of those goods was carried over land from the *Wolga* to the rivers *Duna* and *Neva*; from both they were carried to the city of *Wisbuy* in the *Baltick*, so eminent for its sea-laws; and from the city of *Ladoga* on the *Neva*, we are told they were even carried by the *Dwina* to *Archangel*, and from thence round the *North Cape*.

If iron and hemp will bear the charge of carriage from this inland country, other metals will as well as iron, and certainly silk; since 3d. *per lb.* is not not above 1 *per cent.* on the value, and amounts to £.28 *per ton*.

If the growths of a country find their way out of it, the manufactures of the countries where they go will infallibly find their way into it. They who understand the œconomy and principles of manufactures, know, that it is impossible to establish them in places not populous; and even in those that are populous, hardly possible to establish them to the prejudice of the places

places already in possession of them. Several attempts have been made in *France* and *Spain*, countenanced by the government; to draw from us and establish in those countries, our hard-ware and woollen manufactures, but without success. The reasons are various. A manufacture is part of a great system of commerce, which takes in conveniencies of various kinds, methods of providing materials of all sorts, machines for expediting and facilitating labour, all the channels of correspondence for vending the wares, the credit and confidence necessary to found and support this correspondence, the mutual aid of different artizans, and a thousand other particulars, which time and long experience have gradually established. A part of such a system cannot support itself without the whole, and before the whole can be obtained the part perishes. Manufactures where they are in perfection, are carried on by a multiplicity of hands, each of which is expert only in his own part, no one of them a master of the whole; and if by any means spirited away to a foreign country, he is lost without his fellows. Then it is a matter of the extremest difficulty to persuade a compleat set of workmen, skilled in all parts of a manufactory to leave their country together and settle in a foreign land. Some of the idle and drunken may be enticed away, but these only disappoint their employers, and serve to discourage the undertaking. If by royal munificence, and an expence that the profits of the trade alone would not bear, a compleat set of good and skilful hands are collected and carried over, they find so much of the system imperfect, so many things wanting to carry on the trade to advantage, so many difficulties to overcome, and the knot of hands so easily broken, by death, dissatisfaction and desertion, that they and their employers are discouraged together, and the project vanishes into smoke. Hence it happens, that established manufactures are hardly ever lost, but by foreign conquest, or by some eminent interior fault in manners or government; a bad police oppressing and discouraging the workmen, or religious persecutions driving the sober and industrious out of the country. There is in short, scarce a single instance in history of the contrary, where manufactures have once taken firm root. They sometimes start up in a new place, but are generally supported like exotic plants at more expence than they are worth for any thing but curiosity, until these new seats become

the refuge of the manufacturers driven from the old ones. The conquest of *Constantinople* and final reduction of the *Greek* empire, dispersed many curious manufacturers into different parts of *Christendom*. The former conquests of its provinces had before done the same. The loss of liberty in *Verona*, *Milan*, *Florence*, *Pisa*, *Pistoia*, and other great cities of *Italy*, drove the manufacturers of woolen cloth into *Spain* and *Flanders*. The latter first lost their trade and manufacturers to *Antwerp* and the cities of *Brabant*; from whence by persecution for religion they were sent into *Holland* and *England*. The civil wars during the minority of *Charles* the first of *Spain*, which ended in the loss of the liberty of their great towns, ended too in the loss of the manufactures of *Toledo*, *Segovia*, *Salamanca*, *Medina del campo*, &c. The revocation of the edict of *Nantes*, communicated, to all the Protestant parts of *Europe*, the paper, silk, and other valuable manufactures of *France*, almost peculiar at that time to that country, and till then in vain attempted elsewhere.

To be convinc'd that it is not soil and climate, or even freedom from taxes, that determines the residence of manufacturers, we need only turn our eyes on *Holland*, where a multitude of manufactures are still carried on (perhaps more than on the same extent of territory any where in *Europe*) and sold on terms upon which they cannot be had in any other part of the world. And this too is true of those growths, which by their nature and the labour required to raise them, come the nearest to manufactures.

As to the common-place objection to the *North American* settlements, that they are in the same climate and their produce the same as that of *England*; in the first place it is not true; it is particularly not so of the countries now likely to be added to our settlements; and of our present colonies, the products, lumber, tobacco, rice and indigo, great articles of commerce do not interfere with the products of *England*: in the next place, a man must know very little of the trade of the world, who does not know, that the greater part of it is carried on between countries whose climate differs very little. Even the trade between the different parts of these *British* islands, is greatly superior to that between *England* and all the *West India* islands put together.

If I have been successful in proving that a considerable commerce may and will subsist between us and our future most inland settlements in *North America*, notwithstanding their distance, I have more than half proved no other inconvenience will arise from their distance. Many men in such a country, must “*know*,” must “*think*,” and must “*care*” about the country they chiefly trade with. The juridical and other connections of government are yet a faster hold than even commercial ties, and spread directly and indirectly far and wide. Business to be solicited and causes depending, create a great intercourse even where private property is not divided in different countries, yet this division will always subsist where different countries are ruled by the same government. Where a man has landed property both in the mother country and a province, he will almost always live in the mother country: this, though there were no trade, is singly a sufficient gain. It is said, that *Ireland* pays near a million *Sterling* annually to its absentees in *England*: The balance of trade from *Spain* or even *Portugal* is scarcely equal to this.

Let it not be said we have no absentees from *North America*. There are many to the writer’s knowledge; and if there are at present but few of them that distinguish themselves here by great expence, it is owing to the mediocrity of fortune among the inhabitants of the *Northern Colonies*; and a more equal division of landed property, than in the *West India* islands, so that there are as yet but few large estates. But if those who have such estates resides upon and take care of them themselves, are they worse subjects than they would be if they lived idly in *England*? Great merit is assumed for the gentlemen of the *West Indies*, on the score of their residing and spending their money in *England*. I would not depreciate that merit; it is considerable, for they might, if they pleased spend their money in *France*: but the difference between their spending it *here* and *at home* is not so great. What do they spend it in when they are here, but the produce and manufactures of this country; and would they not do the same if they were at home? is it of any great importance to the *English* farmer, whether the *West India* gentleman comes to *London* and eats his beef, pork, and tongues, fresh, or has them brought to him in the *West Indies* salted: whether he eats his *English* cheese and butter or drinks his *English* ale at *London* or in *Barbados*? Is the clothier’s,

or the mercer's, or the cutler's, or the toy-man's, profit less, for their goods being worn and consumed by the same persons residing on the other side of the ocean? Would not the profits of the merchant and mariner be rather greater, and some addition made to our navigation, ships and seamen? If the *North American* gentleman stays in his own country, and lives there in that degree of luxury and expence with regard to the use of *British* manufactures, that his fortune entitles him to; may not his example (from the imitation of superiors so natural to mankind) spread the use of those manufactures among hundreds of families around him, and occasion a much greater demand for them, than it would do if he should remove and live in *London*?

However this may be, if in our views of immediate advantage, it seems preferable that the gentlemen of large fortunes in *North America* should reside much in *England*, 'tis what may surely be expected as fast as such fortunes are acquired there. Their having "colleges of their own for the education of their youth," will not prevent it: A little knowledge and learning acquired, increases the appetite for more, and will make the conversation of the learned on this side the water more strongly desired. *Ireland* has its university likewise; yet this does not prevent the immense pecuniary benefit we receive from that kingdom. And there will always be in the conveniences of life, the politeness, the pleasures, the magnificence of the reigning country, many other attractions besides those of learning, to draw men of substance there, where they can, apparently at least, have the best bargain of happiness for their money.

Our trade to the *West India* islands is undoubtedly a valuable one: but whatever is the amount of it, it has long been at a stand. Limited as our sugar planters are by the scantiness of territory, they cannot increase much beyond their present number; and this is an evil, as I shall shew hereafter, that will be little helped, by our keeping *Guadaloupe*. The trade to our *Northern Colonies*, is not only greater, but yearly increasing with the increase of people: and even in a greater proportion, as the people increase in wealth and the ability of spending as well as in numbers. I have already said, that our people in the *Northern Colonies* double in about 25 years, exclusive of the accession of strangers. That I speak within bounds, I appeal to the authentic accounts frequently required by the board of trade, and transmitted

transmitted to that board by the respective governors; of which accounts I shall select one as a sample, being that from the colony of *Rhode Island**; a colony that of all the others receives the least addition from strangers. For the increase of our trade to those colonies, I refer to the accounts frequently laid before Parliament, by the officers of the customs, and to the custom-house books: from which I have also selected one account, that of the trade from *England* (exclusive of *Scotland*) to *Pennsylvania* †; a colony most remarkable for the plain frugal manner of living of its inhabitants, and the most suspected of carrying on manufactures on account of the number of *German* artizans, who are known to have transplanted themselves into that country, tho' even these, in truth when they come there, generally apply themselves to agriculture as the surest support and most advantageous employment. By this account it appears, that the exports to that province have in 28 years, increased nearly in the proportion of 17 to 1; whereas the people themselves, who by other authentic accounts appear to double their numbers (the strangers who settled there included) in about

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**Copy of the Report of Governor Hopkins to the Board of Trade, on the Numbers of People in Rhode Island.*

In obedience to your lordships' commands. I have caused the within account to be taken by officers under oath. By it there appears to be in this colony, at this time 35,939 white persons, and 4697 blacks, chiefly negroes.

In the year 1730, by order of the then lords commissioners of trade and plantations, an account was taken of the number of people in this colony and then there appeared to be 15,302 white persons, and 2633 blacks.

Again in the year 1748, by like order, an account was taken of the number of people in this colony, by which it appears there were at that time 29,755 white persons, and 4373 blacks.

STEPHEN HOPKINS.

Colony of Rhode Island,

Dec. 24, 1755.

†*An Account of the Value of the Exports from England to Pennsylvania, in one Year, taken at different Periods, viz.*

In 1723 they amounted only to	£. 15,992 : 19 : 4
1730 they were	48,592 : 7 : 5
1737	56,990 : 6 : 7
1742	75,295 : 3 : 4
1747	82,404 : 17 : 7
1752	201,666 : 19 : 11
1757	269,426 : 6 : 6

N. B. The accounts for 1758 and 1759 are not yet completed; but those acquainted with the *North American* trade, know, that the increase in those two years, has been in a still greater proportion; the last year being supposed to exceed any former year by a third; and this owing to the increased ability of the people to spend, from the greater quantities of money circulating among them by the war.

16 years, cannot in the 28 years have increased in a greater proportion than as 4 to 1: the additional demand then, and consumption of goods from *England*, of 13 parts in 17 more than the additional number would require, must be owing to this, that the people having by their industry mended their circumstances, are enabled to indulge themselves in finer cloaths, better furniture, and a more general use of all our manufactures than heretofore. In fact, the occasion for *English* goods in *North America*, and the inclination to have and use them, is and must be for ages to come, much greater than the ability of the people to pay for them; they must therefore, as they now do, deny themselves many things they would otherwise chuse to have, or increase their industry to obtain them; and thus, if they should at any time manufacture some coarse article, which on account of its bulk or some other circumstance, cannot so well be brought to them from *Britain*, it only enables them the better to pay for finer goods that otherwise they could not indulge themselves in: So that the exports thither are not diminished by such manufacture but rather increased. The single article of manufacture in these colonies mentioned by the *remarker*, is *bats* made in *New England*. It is true there have been ever since the first settlement of that country, a few hatters there, drawn thither probably at first by the facility of getting beaver, while the woods were but little clear'd, and there was plenty of those animals. The case is greatly alter'd now. The beaver skins are not now to be had in *New England*, but from very remote places and at great prices. The trade is accordingly declining there, so that, far from being able to make hats in any quantity for exportation, they cannot supply their home demand; and it is well known that some thousand dozens are sent thither yearly from *London*, and sold there cheaper than the inhabitants can make them of equal goodness. In fact, the colonies are so little suited for establishing of manufactures, that they are continually losing the few branches they accidentally gain. The working brafiers, cuttlers, and pewterers, as well as hatters, who have happened to go over from time to time and settle in the colonies, gradually drop the working part of their business, and import their respective goods from *England*, whence they can have them cheaper and better than they can make them. They continue their shops indeed, in the same way of dealing, but be-

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come *sellers* of braſiery, cutlery, pewter, hats, &c. brought from *England* , inſtead of being *makers* of thoſe goods.

Thus much as to the apprehenſion of our colonies becoming *uſeleſs* to us. I ſhall next conſider the other ſuppoſition, that their growth may render them *dangerous* . Of this I own, I have not the leaſt conception, when I conſider that we have already fourteen ſeperate governments on the maritime coaſt of the continent, and if we extend our ſettlements ſhall probably have as many more behind them on the inland ſide. Thoſe we now have, are not only under different governors, but have different forms of government, different laws, different intereſts, and ſome of them different religious perſuaſions and different manners. Their jealouſy of each other is ſo great that however neceſſary an union of the colonies has long been, for their common defence and ſecurity againſt their enemies, and how ſenſible ſoever each colony has been of that neceſſity, yet they have never been able to effect ſuch an union among themſelves, nor even to agree in requeſting the mother country to eſtabliſh it for them. Nothing but the immediate command of the crown has been able to produce even the imperfect union but lately ſeen there, of the forces of ſome colonies. If they could not agree to unite for their defence againſt the *French* and *Indians* , who were perpetually haraſſing their ſettlements, burning their villages, and murdering their people; can it reaſonably be ſuppoſed there is any danger of their uniting againſt their own nation, which protects and encourages them, with which they have ſo many connections and ties of blood, intereſt and affection, and which 'tis well known they all love much more than they love one another? In ſhort, there are ſo many cauſes that muſt operate to prevent it, that I will venture to ſay, an union amongſt them for ſuch a purpoſe is not merely improbable, it is impoſſible; and if the union of the whole is impoſſible, the attempt of a part muſt be madneſs: as thoſe colonies that did not join the rebellion, would join the mother country in ſuppreſſing it.

When I ſay ſuch an union is impoſſible, I mean without the moſt grievous tyranny and oppreſſion. People who have property in a country which they may loſe, and privileges which they may endanger; are generally diſpoſed to be quiet; and even to bear much, rather than hazard all. While the government is mild and juſt, while important civil and religious rights are ſecure, ſuch ſubjects will be dutiful and obedient. The waves

do not rise, but when the winds blow. What such an administration as the Duke of *Alva's* in the *Netherlands*, might produce, I know not; but this I think I have a right to deem impossible. And yet there were two very manifest differences between that case, and ours, and both are in our favour. The first, that *Spain* had already united the seventeen provinces under one visible government, tho' the states continued independant: The second, that the inhabitants of those provinces were of a nation, not only different from, but utterly unlike the *Spaniards*. Had the *Netherlands* been peopled from *Spain*, the worst of oppression had probably not provoked them to wish a separation of government. It might and probably would have ruined the country, but would never have produced an independant sovereignty. In fact, neither the very worst of governments, the worst of politicks in the last century, nor the total abolition of their remaining liberty, in the provinces of *Spain* itself, in the present, have produced any independency that could be supported. The same may be observed of *France*. And let it not be said that the neighbourhood of these to the seat of government has prevented a separation. While our strength at sea continues, the banks of the *Ohio*, (in point of easy and expeditious conveyance of troops) are nearer to *London*, than the remote parts of *France* and *Spain* to their respective capitals; and much nearer than *Connaught* and *Ulster* were in the days of *Queen Elizabeth*. No body foretels the dissolution of the *Russian* monarchy from its extent, yet I will venture to say, the eastern parts of it are already much more inaccessible from *Petersburgh* than the country on the *Mississipi* is from *London*; I mean more men, in less time, might be conveyed the latter than the former distance. The rivers *Oby*, *Jenesed* and *Lena*, do not facilitate the communication half so well by their course, nor are they half so practicable as the *American* rivers. To this I shall only add the observation of *Machiavel*, in his *Prince*, that a government seldom long preserves its dominion over those who are foreigners to it; who on the other hand fall with great ease, and continue inseparably annex'd to the government of their own nation, which he proves by the fate of the *English conquests* in *France*.

Yet with all these disadvantages, so difficult is it to overturn an established government, that it was not without the assistance of *France* and *England* that the *United Provinces* supported themselves: which teaches us, that if the visionary danger of independency in

our colonies is to be feared, nothing is more likely to render it substantial than the neighbourhood of foreigners at enmity with the sovereign government, capable of giving either aid or an asylum; as the event shall require. Yet against even these disadvantages, did *Spain* preserve almost ten provinces, merely thro' their want of union, which indeed could never have taken place among the others, but for causes, some of which are in our case impossible, and others it is impious to suppose possible.

The *Romans* well understood that policy which teaches the security arising to the chief government from separate states among the governed, when they restored the liberties of the states of *Greece*, (oppressed but united under *Macedon*,) by an edict that every state should live under its own laws.* They did not even name a governor. *Independence of each other, and separate interests*, tho' among a people united by common manners, language, and I may say religion, inferior neither in wisdom, bravery, nor their love of liberty, to the *Romans* themselves, was all the security the sovereigns wished for their sovereignty. It is true; they did not call themselves sovereigns; they set no value on the title; they were contented with possessing the thing; and possess it they did, even without a standing army. What can be a stronger proof of the security of their possession? And yet by a policy similar to this throughout, was the *Roman* world subdued and held: a world composed of above an hundred languages and sets of manners different from those of their masters.† Yet this dominion was unshakeable, till the loss of liberty and corruption of manners over turned it.

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* *Omnes Græcorum civitates, quæ in Europa, quæque in Asia essent, libertatem ac suas leges haberent, &c.* Liv. lib. 33. c. 30.

† When the *Romans* had subdued *Macedon* and *Illyricum*, they were both form'd into republicks by a decree of the senate, and *Macedon* was thought safe from the danger of a revolution, by being divided, into a division common among the *Romans*, as we learn from the tetrarchs in scripture. *Omnium primum liberos esse: placebat Mæcedonas atque Illyrios; ut omnibus gentibus appare-ret, arma populi Romani non liberis servitutem, sed contra servientibus libertatem afferre. Ut & in libertate gentes quæ essent, tutam eam sibi perpetuamque sub-tusela populi Romani esse: & quæ sub regibus viverent, & in presens tempus mi-ziores eos justioresque respectu populi Romani habere se; & si quando bellum cum populo Romano regibus fuisset suis, exitum ejus victoriam Romanis, sibi libertatem allaturum crederent.*— In quatuor regiones describi *Macedoniam*, ut suum quæque concilium haberet, placuit: & dimidium tributum quam quod regibus ferre soliti erant, # populo Romano pendere. Similia his & in *Illyricum* mandata.

Liv. lib. 45. c. 18.

But what is the prudent policy inculcated by the *remarker*, to obtain this end, security of dominion over our colonies : It is, to leave the *French* in *Canada*, to “*check*” their growth, for otherwise our people may “increase infinitely from all causes.” We have already seen in what manner the *French* and their *Indians* *check the growth* of our colonies. ’Tis a modest word, this, *check*, for massacring men, women and children. The writer would if he could, hide from himself as well as from the public, the horror arising from such a proposal, by couching it in general terms : ’tis no wonder he thought it a “subject not fit for discussion” in his letter, tho’ he recommends it as “a point that should be the constant object of the ministers attention !-----” But if *Canada* is restored on this principle, will not *Britain* be guilty of all the blood to be shed, all the murders to be committed in order to check this dreaded growth of our own people ? Will not this be telling the *French* in plain terms, that the horrid barbarities they perpetrate with their *Indians* on our colonists are agreeable to us ; and that they need not apprehend the resentment of a government with whose views they so happily concur ? Will not the colonies view it in this light ? Will they have reason to consider themselves any longer as subjects and children, when they find their cruel enemies halloo’d upon them by the country from whence they sprung, the government that owes them protection as it requires their obedience ? Is not this the most likely means of driving them into the arms of the *French*, who can invite them by an offer of that security their own government chuses not to afford them ? I would not be thought to insinuate that the *remarker* wants humanity. I know how little many good natured persons are affected by the distresses of people at a distance and whom they do not know. There are even those, who, being present, can sympathize sincerely with the grief of a lady on the sudden death of her favourite bird, and yet can read of the sinking of a city in *Syria* with very little concern. If it be, after all, thought necessary to *check* the growth of our colonies, give me leave to propose a method less cruel. It is a method of which we have an example in scripture. The murder of husbands, of wives, of brothers, sisters, and children whose pleasing society has been for some time enjoyed, affects deeply the respective surviving relations : but grief for the death of a child just born

is short and easily supported. The method I mean is that which was dictated by the *Egyptian* policy, when the “infinite increase” of the *children of Israel* was apprehended as dangerous to the state.* Let an act of parliament, than be made, enjoining the colony midwives to stifle in the birth every third or fourth child. By this means you may keep the colonies to their present size. And if they were under the hard alternative of submitting to one or the other of these schemes for *checking* their growth, I dare answer for them, they would prefer the latter.

But all this debate about the propriety or impropriety of keeping or restoring *Canada*, is possibly too early. We have taken the capital indeed, but the country is yet far from being in our possession; and perhaps never will be: for if our M-----rs are persuaded by such counsellors as the *remarker*, that the *French* there are “not the worst of neighbours,” and that if we had conquered *Canada*, we ought for our own sakes to restore it, as a *check* to the growth of our colonies, I am then afraid we shall never take it. For there are many ways of avoiding the completion of the conquest, that will be less exceptionable and less odious than the giving it up.

The objection I have often heard, that if we had *Canada*, we could not people it, without draining *Britain* of its inhabitants, is founded on ignorance of the nature of population in new countries. When we first began to colonize in *America*, it was necessary to send people, and to send seed-corn; but it is not now necessary that we should furnish, for a new colony, either one or the other. The annual increment alone of our present colonies, without diminishing their numbers, or requiring a man from hence, is sufficient in ten years to fill *Canada* with double the number of *English* that it now has of *French* inhabitants‡. Those who are protestants among the *French*, will probably chuse to remain under the *English* government; many will chuse to re-

* And *Pharaoh* said unto his people, behold the people of the children of *Israel* are more and mightier than we; come on, let us deal *wisely* with them; *lest they multiply*; and it come to pass that when there falleth out any war, they join also unto our enemies and fight against us, and so get them up out of the land.-----And the king spake to the *Hebrew* midwives, &c.
Exodus, Chap. 1.

‡ In fact, there has not gone from *Britain* to our colonies these 20 years past, to settle there, so many as 10 families a year; the new settlers are either the offspring of the old, or emigrants from *Germany* or the north of *Ireland*.

remove if they can be allowed to sell their land, improvements and effects: the rest in that thinsettled country, will in less than half a century, from the crowds of *English* settling round and among them, be blended and incorporated with our people both in language and manners.

In *Gaudaloupe* the case is somewhat different; and though I am far from thinking we have sugar land enough*, I cannot think *Gaudaloupe* is so desirable an increase of it, as other objects the enemy would probably be infinitely more ready to part with. A country *fully inhabited* by any nation is no proper possession for another of different language, manners and religion. It is hardly ever tenable at less expence than it is worth.----But the isle of *Cayenne*, and its appendix *Equinoctial-France*, would indeed be an acquisition every way suitable to our situation and desires. This would hold all that migrate from *Barbadoes*, the *Leeward-Islands* or *Jamaica*. It would certainly recal into an *English* government (in which there would be room for millions) all who have before settled or purchased in *Martinico*, *Gaudaloupe*, *Santa-Cruz* or *St. John's*, except such as know not the value of an *English* government, and such I am sure are not worth recalling.

But should we keep *Gaudaloupe*, we are told it would enable us to export £. 300,000 in sugars. Admit it to be true, though perhaps the amazing increase of *English* consumption might stop most of it here, to whose profit is this to redound? to the profit of the *French* inhabitants of the island: except a small part that should fall to the share of the *English* purchasers, but whose whole purchase money must first be added to the wealth and circulation of *France*.

I grant, however, much of this £. 300,000 would be expended in *British* manufactures. Perhaps, too, a few of the landowners of *Gaudaloupe* might dwell and spend their fortunes in *Britain*, (though probably much fewer than of the inhabitants of *North America*). I admit the advantage arising to us from these circumstances, (as far as they go) in the case of *Gaudaloupe*, as well

* It is often said we have plenty of sugar-land still unemployed in *Jamaica*: but those who are well acquainted with that island, know, that the remaining vacant land in it is generally situated among mountains, rocks and gullies, that make carriage impracticable, so that no profitable use can be made of it, unless the price of sugars should so greatly increase as to enable the planter to make very expensive roads, by blowing up rocks, erecting bridges, &c. every 2 or 300 yards.

well as in that of our other *West India* settlements. Yet even this consumption is little better than that of an allied nation would be, who should take our manufactures and supply us with sugar, and put us to no expence in defending the place of growth.

But though our own colonies expend among us almost the whole produce of our sugar, can we or ought we to promise ourselves this will be the case of *Gaudaloupe*. One 100,000*£*. will supply them with *British* manufactures; and supposing we can effectually prevent the introduction of those of *France*, (which is morally impossible in a country used to them) the other 200,000 will still be spent in *France*, in the education of their children and support of themselves; or else be laid up there, where they will always think their home to be.

Besides this consumption of *British* manufactures, much is said of the benefit we shall have from the situation of *Guadaloupe*, and we are told of a trade to the *Carraccas* and *Spanish Main*. In what respect *Gaudaloupe* is better situated for this trade than *Jamaica*, or even any of our other islands, I am at a loss to guess. I believe it to be not so well situated for that of the windward coast, as *Tobago* and *St. Lucia*, which in this as well as other respects, would be more valuable possessions, and which, I doubt not, the peace will secure to us. Nor is it nearly so well situated for that of the rest of the *Spanish Main* as *Jamaica*. As to the greater safety of our trade by the possession of *Gaudaloupe*, experience has convinced us that in reducing a single island, or even more, we stop the privateering business but little. Privateers still subsist, in equal if not greater numbers, and carry the vessels into *Martinico* which before it was more convenient to carry into *Guadaloupe*. Had we all the *Caribbees*, it is true, they would in those parts be without shelter. Yet upon the whole I suppose it to be a doubtful point and well worth consideration, whether our obtaining possession of all the *Caribbees*, would be more than a temporary benefit, as it would necessarily soon fill the *French* part of *Hispaniola* with *French* inhabitants, and thereby render it five times more valuable in time of peace, and little less than impregnable in time of war; and would probably end in a few years in the uniting the whole of that great and fertile island under a *French* government. It is agreed on all hands, that our conquest of *St. Christophers*, and driving the *French* from thence, first fur-

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nish'd *Hispaniola* with skilful and substantial planters, and was consequently the first occasion of its present opulence. On the other hand, I will hazard an opinion, that valuable as the *French* possessions in the *West Indies* are, and undeniable the advantages they derive from them, there is somewhat to be weighed in the opposite scale. They cannot at present make war with *England*, without exposing those advantages while divided among the numerous islands they now have, much more than they would, were they possessed of *St. Domingo* only; there own share of which would, if well cultivated, grow more sugar, than is now grown in all their *West India* islands.

I have before said I do not deny the utility of the conquest, or even of our future possession of *Gaudaloupe*, if not bought too dear. The trade of the *West Indies* is one of our most valuable trades. Our possessions there deserve our greatest care and attention. So do those of *North America*. I shall not enter into the invidious task of comparing their due estimation. It would be a very long and a very disagreeable one, to run thro' every thing material on this head. It is enough to our present point, if I have shown, that the value of *North America* is capable of an immense increase, by an acquisition and measures, that must necessarily have an effect the direct contrary of what we have been industriously taught to fear; and that *Gaudaloupe* is, in point of advantage, but a very small addition to our *West India* possessions, rendered many ways less valuable to us than it is to the *French*, who will probably set more value upon it than upon a country that is much more valuable to us than to them.

There is a great deal more to be said on all the parts of these subjects; but as it would carry me into a detail that I fear would tire the patience of my readers, and which I am not without apprehensions I have done already, I shall reserve what remains till I dare venture again on the indulgence of the publick.

F I N I S.

In Confirmation of the Writer's Opinion concerning *Population, Manufactures, &c.* he has thought it not amiss to add an Extract from a Piece written some Years since in *America*, where the Facts must be well known, on which the Reasonings are founded. It is intitled

OBSERVATIONS

CONCERNING THE

INCREASE of MANKIND,

Peopling of Countries, &c.

Written in *PENSILVANIA*, 1751.

1. TABLES of the proportion of marriages to births, of deaths to births, of marriages to the numbers of inhabitants, &c. formed on observations made upon the bills of mortality, christenings, &c. of populous cities, will not suit countries; nor will tables formed on observations made on full settled old countries, as *Europe*, suit new countries, as *America*.

2. For people increase in proportion to the number of marriages, and that is greater in proportion to the ease and convenience of supporting a family. When families can be easily supported, more persons marry, and earlier in life.

3. In cities, where all trades, occupations and offices are full, many delay marrying, till they can see how to bear the charges of a family; which charges are greater in cities, as luxury is more common; many live single during life, and continue servants to families, journeymen to trades, &c. hence cities do not by natural generation supply themselves with inhabitants; the deaths are more than the births.

4. In countries full settled, the case must be nearly the same;

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all lands being occupied and improved to the height; those who cannot get land, must labour for others that have it; when labourers are plenty, their wages will be low; by low wages a family is supported with difficulty; this difficulty deters many from marriage, who therefore long continue servants and single. ----- Only as the cities take supplies of people from the country, and thereby make a little more room in the country, marriage is a little more encouraged there, and the births exceed the deaths.

5. Great part of *Europe* is full settled with husbandmen, manufacturers, &c. and therefore cannot now much increase in people: *America* is chiefly occupied by *Indians*, who subsist mostly by hunting. ----- But as the hunter, of all men, requires the greatest quantity of land from whence to draw his subsistence, (the husbandman subsisting on much less, the gardener on still less, and the manufacturer requiring least of all) the *Europeans* found *America* as fully settled as it well could be by hunters; yet these having large tracts, were easily prevailed on to part with portions of territory to the new comers, who did not much interfere with the natives in hunting, and furnished them with many things they wanted.

6. Land being thus plenty in *America*, and so cheap as that a labouring man, that understands husbandry, can in a short time save money enough to purchase a piece of new-land sufficient for a plantation, whereon he may subsist a family; such are not afraid to marry; for if they even look far enough forward to consider how their children when grown up are to be provided for, they see that more land is to be had at rates equally easy, all circumstances considered.

7. Hence marriages in *America* are more general, and more generally early, than in *Europe*. And if it is reckoned there, that there is but one marriage *per annum* among 100 persons, perhaps we may here reckon two; and if in *Europe* they have but four births to a marriage (many of their marriages being late) we may here reckon eight; of which if one half grow up, and our marriages are made, reckoning one with another, at twenty years of age our people must at least be doubled every twenty years.

8. But notwithstanding this increase, so vast is the territory of *North America*, that it will require many ages to settle it fully; and

and till it is fully settled labour will never be cheap here, where no man continues long a labourer for others, but gets a plantation of his own; no man continues long a journeyman to a trade, but goes among those new settlers, and sets up for himself, &c. Hence labour is no cheaper now, in *Pennsylvania*, than it was thirty years ago, tho' so many thousand labouring people have been imported from *Germany* and *Ireland*.

9. The danger therefore of these colonies interfering with their mother country in trades that depend on labour, manufactures, &c. is too remote to require the attention of *Great Britain*.

10. But in proportion to the increase of the colonies, a vast demand is growing for *British* manufactures; a glorious market wholly in the power of *Britain*, in which foreigners cannot interfere, which will increase in a short time even beyond her power of supplying, tho' her whole trade should be to her colonies. * * * * *

12. 'Tis an ill-grounded opinion that by the labour of slaves, *America* may possibly vie in cheapness of manufactures with *Britain*. The labour of slaves can never be so cheap here as the labour of working men is in *Britain*. Any one may compute it. Interest of money is in the colonies from 6 to 10 *per Cent*. Slaves one with another cost 30*l*. Sterling *per* head. Reckon then the interest of the first purchase of a slave, the insurance or risque on his life, his cloathing and diet, expences in his sickness and loss of time, loss by his neglect of business (neglect is natural to the man who is not to be benefited by his own care or diligence) expence of a driver to keep him at work, and his pilfering from time to time, almost every slave being from the nature of slavery a thief, and compare the whole amount with the wages of a manufacturer of iron or wool in *England*, you will see that labour is much cheaper there than it ever can be by negroes here. Why then will *Americans* purchase slaves? Because slaves may be kept as long as a man pleases; or has occasion for their labour; while hired men are continually leaving their master (often in the midst of his business) and setting up for themselves. § 8.

13. As the increase of people depends on the encouragement of marriages, the following things must diminish a nation, *viz*:
i. The being conquered; for the conquerors will engross as many

ny offices, and exact as much tribute or profit on the labour of the conquered, as will maintain them in their new establishment; and this diminishing the subsistence of the natives, discourages their marriages, and so gradually diminishes them; while the foreigners increase. 2. Loss of territory. Thus the *Britons* being driven into *Wales*, and crowded together in a barren country insufficient to support such great numbers, diminished till the people bore a proportion to the produce, while the *Saxons* increased on their abandoned lands, 'till the island became full of *English*. And were the *English* now driven into *Wales* by some foreign nation, there would in a few years be no more *Englishmen* in *Britain*, than there are now people in *Wales*. 3. Loss of trade. Manufactures exported, draw subsistence from foreign countries for numbers; who are thereby enabled to marry and raise families. If the nation be deprived of any branch of trade, and no new employment is found for the people occupy'd in that branch, it will soon be deprived of so many people. 4. Loss of food. Suppose a nation has a fishery, which not only employs great numbers, but makes the food and subsistence of the people cheaper: if another nation becomes master of the seas, and prevents the fishery, the people will diminish in proportion as the loss of employ, and dearth of provision makes it more difficult to subsist a family. 5. Bad government and insecure property. People not only leave such a country, and settling abroad incorporate with other nations, lose their native language, and become foreigners; but the industry of those that remain being discouraged, the quantity of subsistence in the country is lessened, and the support of a family becomes more difficult. So heavy taxes tend to diminish a people. 6. The introduction of slaves. The negroes brought into the *English* sugar islands, have greatly diminished the whites there; the poor are by this means deprived of employment, while a few families acquire vast estates, which they spend on foreign luxuries, and educating their children in the habit of those luxuries; the same income is needed for the support of one, that might have maintained one hundred. The whites who have slaves not labouring, are enfeebled, and therefore not so generally prolific; the slaves being worked too hard, and ill fed, their constitutions are broken, and the deaths among them are more than

than the births; so that a continual supply is needed from *Africa*. The northern colonies having few slaves, encrease in whites. Slaves also pejorate the families that use them; the white children become proud, disgusted with labour, and being educated in idleness, are rendered unfit to get a living by industry.

14. Hence the prince that acquires new territory, if he finds it vacant, or removes the natives to give his own people room; the legislator that makes effectual laws for promoting of trade, increasing employment, improving land by more or better tillage, providing more food by fisheries, securing property, &c. and the man that invents new trades, arts or manufactures, or new improvements in husbandry, may be properly called *Fathers of their Nation*, as they are the cause of the generation of multitudes, by the encouragement they afford to marriage.

15. As to privileges granted to the married, (such as the *jus trium liberorum* among the *Romans*) they may hasten the filling of a country that has been thinned by war or pestilence, or that has otherwise vacant territory, but cannot increase a people beyond the means provided for their subsistence.

16. Foreign luxuries and needless manufactures imported and used in a nation, do, by the same reasoning, increase the people of the nation that furnishes them, and diminish the people of the nation that uses them.---Laws therefore that prevent such importations, and on the contrary promote the exportation of manufactures to be consumed in foreign countries, may be called (with respect to the people that make them) *generative laws*, as by increasing subsistence they encourage marriage. Such laws likewise strengthen a country doubly, by increasing its own people and diminishing its neighbours.

17. Some *European* nations prudently refuse to consume the manufactures of *East-India* :---They should likewise forbid them to their colonies; for the gain to the merchant is not to be compared with the loss by this means of people to the nation.

18. Home luxury in the great increases the nation's manufacturers employed by it, who are many, and only tends to diminish the families that indulge in it, who are few. The greater the common fashionable expence of any rank of people, the more cautious they are of marriage. Therefore luxury should never be suffered to become common.

19. The great increase of offspring in particular families, is not always owing to greater fecundity of nature, but sometimes to examples of industry in the heads, and industrious education; by which the children are enabled to provide better for themselves, and their marrying early is encouraged from the prospect of good subsistence.

20. If there be a sect therefore, in our nation, that regard frugality and industry as religious duties, and educate their children therein, more than others commonly do; such sect must consequently increase more by natural generation, than any other sect in *Britain*.---

21. The importation of foreigners into a country that has as many inhabitants as the present employments and provisions for subsistence will bear, will be in the end no increase of people, unless the new-comers have more industry and frugality than the natives, and then they will provide more subsistence and increase in the country; but they will gradually eat the natives out.--- Nor is it necessary to bring in foreigners to fill up any occasional vacancy in a country; for such vacancy (if the laws are good, § 14, 16) will soon be filled by natural generation. Who can now find the vacancy made in *Sweden*, *France*, or other warlike nations, by the plague of herosifin 40 years ago; in *France*, by the expulsion of the protestants; in *England*, by the settlement of her colonies; or in *Guinea*, by 100 years exportation of slaves that has blackened half *America*?---The thinness of the inhabitants in *Spain*, is owing to national pride and idleness, and other causes, rather than to the expulsion of the *Moor*s, or to the making of new settlements.

22. There is in short no bound to the prolific nature of plants or animals, but what is made by their crowding and interfering with each other's means of subsistence. Was the face of the earth vacant of other plants, it might be gradually sowed and overspread with one kind only; as for instance, with Fennel; and were it empty of other inhabitants, it might in a few ages be replenished from one nation only; as for instance, with *Englishmen*. Thus there are supposed to be now upwards of one Million *English* souls in *North America*, (tho' 'tis thought scarce 80,000 have been brought over sea) and yet perhaps there is not one the fewer in *Britain*, but rather many more, on account of the employment the colonies afford to manufacture at home. This million doubling,

ling, suppose but once in 25 years, will in another century be more than the people of *England*, and the greatest number of *Englishmen* will be on this side the water. What an accession of power to the *British* empire by sea as well as land! What increase of trade and navigation! What numbers of ships and seamen! We have been here but little more than 100 years, and yet the force of our privateers in the late war, united, was greater, both in men and guns, than that of the whole *British* navy in queen *Elizabeth's* time.-----How important an affair then to *Britain*, is the present treaty* for settling the bounds between her colonies and the *French*, and how careful should she be to secure room enough, since on the room depends so much the increase of her people?

23. In fine, a nation well regulated is like a polypus§; take away a limb, its place is soon supply'd; cut it in two, and each deficient part shall speedily grow out of the part remaining. Thus if you have room and subsistence enough, as you may by dividing, make ten polypuses out of one, you may of one make ten nations, equally populous and powerful; or rather, increase a nation ten fold in numbers and strength. * * * * *

* 1751.

§ A water insect, well known to naturalists.



SINCE the foregoing sheets were printed off, the writer has obtained accounts of the Exports to *North America*, and the *West India Islands*, by which it appears, that there has been some increase of trade to those *Islands* as well as to *North America*, though in a much less degree. The following extract from these accounts will show the reader at one view the amount of the exports to each, in two different terms of five years; the terms taken at ten years distance from each other, to show the increase, *viz.*

First Term, from 1744 to 1748, inclusive,

<i>Northern Colonies.</i>				<i>West India Islands.</i>	
1744	- £.640,114 12 4	-	-	£.796,112 17 9	
1745	- 534,316 2 5	-	-	503,669 19 9	
1746	- 754,945 4 3	-	-	472,994 19 7	
1747	- 726,648 5 5	-	-	856,463 18 6	
1748	- 830,243 16 9	-	-	734,095 15 3	
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Total, £.	3,486,268 1 2	Tot. £.	3,363,337 10 10		
		Difference,	122,930 10 4		
				£. 3,486,268 1 2	

Second Term, from 1754 to 1758, inclusive.

<i>Northern Colonies</i>				<i>West India Islands.</i>	
1754	- 1,246,615 1 11	-	-	685,675 3 0	
1755	- 1,177,848 6 10	-	-	694,667 13 3	
1756	- 1,428,720 18 10	-	-	733,458 16 3	
1757	- 1,727,924 2 10	-	-	776,488 0 6	
1758	- 1,832,948 13 10	-	-	877,571 19 11	
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Total, £.	7,414,057 4 3	Tot. £.	3,767,841 12 11		
		Difference,	3,646,215 11 4		
				£. 7,414,057 4 3	

In the first Term, total for <i>West India Islands</i> ,		3,363,337 10 10
In the second Term, ditto		3,767,841 12 11

Increase, only £.		0,404,504 2 1
In the first Term, total for <i>Northern Colonies</i> ,		3,486,268 1 2
In the second Term, ditto		7,414,057 4 3

Increase, £.		3,927,789 3 1

By these accounts it appears, that the Exports to the *West India Islands*, and to the *Northern Colonies*, were in the first term nearly

nearly equal; the difference being only 122,936*l.* 10*s.* 4*d.* and in the second term, the Exports to those islands had only increased 404,504*l.* 2*s.* 1*d.*---Whereas the increase to the *Northern Colonies* is 3,927,789*l.* 3*s.* 1*d.* almost FOUR MILLIONS.

Some part of this increased demand for *English* goods, may be ascribed to the armies and fleets we have had both in *North America* and the *West Indies*; not so much for what is consumed by the soldiery; their clothing, stores, ammunition, &c. sent from hence on account of the government, being (as is supposed) not included in these accounts of merchandize exported; but as the war has occasioned a great plenty of money in *America*, many of the inhabitants have increased their expence.

These accounts do not include any Exports from *Scotland* to *America*, which are doubtless proportionably considerable; nor the Exports from *Ireland*.

T H E E N D.

